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Abstract
Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for games in uncertain networked systems without a prior knowledge about control
directions is explored in this paper. More specifically, the dynamics of the players are supposed to be first-order or second-order
systems in which the control directions are unknown and there are parametric uncertainties. To achieve Nash equilibrium
seeking in a distributed way, Nussbaum function based strategies are proposed through separately designing an optimization
module and a state regulation module. The optimization module generates a reference trajectory, that can search for the
Nash equilibrium, for the state regulation module. The state regulator is designed to steer the players’ actions to the reference
trajectory. An adaptive law is included in the state regulation module to compensate for the uncertain parameter in the players’
dynamics and the Nussbaum function is included to address the unavailability of the control directions. Fully distributed
implementations of the proposed algorithms are discussed and investigated. Through our analytical explorations, we show that
the proposed seeking strategies can drive the players’ actions to the Nash equilibrium asymptotically without requiring the
homogeneity of the players’ unknown control directions based on Barbalat’s lemma. A numerical example is given to support
the theoretical analysis of the proposed algorithms.
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1 Introduction
Games under distributed communication networks are re-
ceiving increasing attention due to their wide applications
in numerous fields. For example, the connectivity control
of mobile sensor networks was modeled as a game in which
each sensor’s objective function contains a local cost that
models the sensor’s local goal (e.g., source seeking) and
a global cost that describes the sensor’s willingness to
keep connectivity with other sensors [1]. Inspired by the
observation that practical engineering systems are usually
afflicted with model uncertainties and disturbance, an
extended-state-observer based robust Nash equilibrium
seeking strategy was proposed in [1]. Energy consumption
control might be formulated as an aggregative game, in
which each user’s cost function depends on the user’s own
energy consumption and the total energy consumption
of all users [2]. Dynamic average consensus algorithms
can be adapted as an aggregation estimator, based on
which distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithms
were constructed [2]. Congestion control problems in wire-
less sensor networks can be viewed as a semi-aggregative
game, in which each data transmitter makes decisions
on its data transmission to maximize its own profit [3].
Interference graphs can be introduced for the interaction
descriptions among the data transmitters, based on which
Nash equilibrium seeking algorithms were designed in [3].
Moreover, noncooperative games can be utilized to illus-
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trate the interactions among groups of discrete-time and
continuous-time agents under distributed communication
networks [4]. Motivated by the broad applications of net-
worked games, distributed Nash equilibrium seeking has
attracted a lot of interests in the past few years and quite
a few distributed schemes have been proposed to achieve
distributed Nash equilibrium seeking. The existing works
provide some interesting viewpoints to cope with Nash
equilibrium seeking for games in which the players’ actions
can be freely designed (e.g., [20][21][22][23]) or governed
by simple dynamics (see e.g., [24][25]) or possibly subject
to disturbance and un-modeled dynamics (see e.g, [1]). A
common premise of the existing works is that the control
directions are known to the players.
It should be noted that control directions determine the
motion directions of a control system and are greatly im-
portant as a control force with incorrect direction may de-
teriorate the system and cause undesired system control
performance [13]. With the information on control direc-
tions, the controller design becomes much simpler. Nev-
ertheless, in some practical circumstances, the control di-
rections are unknown. For instance, due to the inaccurate
camera parameters and image depth, the manipulator tra-
jectory tracking control of visual servo system may need
to address the unknown control directions [6]. Affected by
speed variations and loading conditions of the complex,
varying environment, the model of ships contains large un-
certainties and hence, the autopilot design of time-varying
ships requires the accommodation of unknown control di-
rections [7]. It was recognized that the longitudinal dy-
namics of the air-breathing hypersonic vehicle suffer from
unknown control directions as well [9]. Furthermore, the
authors in [10] argued that in some situations, it is difficult
to detect the control directions of quadrotor unmanned
aerial vehicles. Without the information on control direc-
tions, the controller design becomes much more challeng-
ing especially for multi-agent systems.
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Many researchers have been dedicated to investigate sys-
tems with unknown control directions. Adaptive designs
with Nussbaum-type functions, which can be traced back
to [8], are shown to be effective to deal with uncertain-
ties in control directions. In [12], the Nussbaum-type func-
tions were adopted to achieve adaptive control of nonlin-
ear systems with arbitrary dynamic order and paramet-
ric uncertainties. Extremum seekers with unknown control
directions were proposed in [15]. Output feedback control
for discrete-time systems without a prior control direction
knowledge was studied in [17] in which a discrete Nuss-
baum gain was utilized to achieve asymptotic output track-
ing. Nussbaum functions were discussed in [13] for systems
with time-varying unknown control directions. With the
development of multi-agent systems, cooperative control of
multi-agent systems with unknown control directions has
received increasing attention. For example, the authors in
[11] considered consensus among a network of first-order
integrator-type agents with unknown control directions. In
[16], the authors supposed that some control directions are
known based on which consensus of multi-agent systems
with partially unknown and non-identical control direc-
tions was addressed. Cooperative output consensus in het-
erogeneous multi-agent systems with non-identical control
directions was considered in [18], where Nussbaum-type
functions were adopted to achieve global cooperative out-
put regulation. Distributed optimization among a network
of high-order integrator-type agents was addressed in [19]
without utilizing prior knowledge about control directions.
Fully distributed consensus among high-order nonlinear
systems in which the agents have heterogenous unknown
control directions was investigated in [29]. A new Nuss-
baum function was employed to deal with the unknown
control directions and it was shown that the agents’ out-
put can achieve asymptotic consensus [29].Nevertheless,
to the best of the authors’ knowledge, distributed
Nash equilibrium seeking for networked games in
which the players are subject to unknown control
directions and uncertain parameters still remains
to be addressed. Motivated by the above observations,
this paper tries to shed some light on distributed Nash
equilibrium seeking strategy design without utilizing con-
trol direction information.
In comparison with the existing works, the main contribu-
tions of this paper are summarized as follows.
(1) Different from the existing works that consider games
with known control directions, the seeking strategies
proposed in this paper do not require prior direc-
tion information. To the best of the authors’ knowl-
edge, this is the first work that addresses distributed
Nash equilibrium seeking for games with unknown
control directions. Besides, this paper also accommo-
dates parametric uncertainties in the players’ dynam-
ics. Through a modular design, this paper proposes
Nussbaum function based adaptive seeking strategies
to achieve distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for
games in both first-order and second-order systems
with unknown control directions and parametric un-
certainties.
(2) Based on Barbalat’s lemma, it is theoretically shown
that the players’ actions can be steered to the Nash
equilibrium while the other auxiliary variables stay
bounded by utilizing the proposed algorithms.
(3) Discussions on fully distributed implementation of the
proposed algorithms are provided. The explorations
show that through adaptive parameter designs, the
proposed fully distributed algorithms are effective.
We organize the remaining sections as follows. Some pre-
liminaries are given in Section 2 and the considered prob-
lem is formulated in Section 3. Section 4 presents the main
results of the paper, in which first-order and second-order
systems with unknown control directions and parametric
uncertainties are visited, successively. Discussions on fully
distributed implementations of the proposed methods are
provided in Section 5. Following the theoretical investiga-
tions of the developed methods, Section 6 provides numer-
ical studies. In the end, conclusions are given in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
The following definitions or lemmas will be utilized in the
rest of the paper.
Definition 1 [11] A continuously differentiable function
N0(·) is called a Nussbaum function if
lim
q→∞
sup
1
q
∫ q
0
N0(s)ds =∞,
lim
q→∞
inf
1
q
∫ q
0
N0(s)ds = −∞.
(1)
Typical examples of Nussbaum functions include k2 cos(k),
k2 sin(k), to mention just a few. Interested readers are re-
ferred to [13] for more detailed discussions of Nussbaum
functions. In this paper, we adopt N0(k) = k
2 sin(k).
Lemma 1 [12] Suppose that V (·) and k(·) are smooth func-
tions defined on [0, tf), where tf is a positive constant and
V (t) ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [0, tf). Moreover, if
V (t) ≤
∫ t
0
(a0N0(k(τ)) + 1)k˙(τ)dτ + c, ∀t ∈ [0, tf ), (2)
where a0 is a nonzero constant,N0 is an even smooth Nuss-
baum function, and c is a suitable constant. Then, V (t), k(t)
and
∫ t
0
(aN0(k(τ)) + 1)k˙(τ)dτ are bounded on [0, tf ).
Lemma 2 (Barbalat’s Lemma [26]) Suppose that
g(t) : R → R is a uniformly continuous function. Then,
limt→∞ g(t) = 0 given that limt→∞
∫ t
0
g(s)ds exists and is
finite.
A graph G contains a node set V = {1, 2, · · · ,M} (M ≥ 2
is an integer) and an edge set Ed. The elements of Ed
are represented by (i, j), which illustrates an edge from
node i to node j and indicates that node j can receive
information from node i but not necessarily vice versa.
If (i, j) ∈ Ed implies that (j, i) ∈ Ed for all i, j ∈ V .
The network is undirected. A directed path from node ik
to node ik+l is a sequence of ordered edges denoted by
(ik+j , ik+j+1), j = 0, 1, 2, · · · , l − 1. A directed graph is
said to be strongly connected if there is a directed path
between any two distinct nodes. Similarly, an undirected
graph is connected if there is a path between any two dis-
tinct nodes. The adjacency matrix A of a directed graph G
is a matrix whose (i, j)th entry is aij , which is positive if
(j, i) ∈ Ed, else, aij = 0. Moreover, aii = 0. The adjacency
matrix of an undirected graph is similarly defined with a
further requirement that aij = aji for all i 6= j. Moreover,
the Laplacian matrix of graph G is L = D−A, in which D
2
is a diagonal matrix whose ith diagonal entry is
∑M
j=1 aij
[5][30].
3 Problem Formulation
Consider a game with N players in which the action and
cost function of player i is represented by xi ∈ R and fi(x) :
R
N → R, respectively, where x = [x1, x2, · · · , xN ]T . De-
note the player set as N = {1, 2, · · · , N} and suppose that
the players’ actions are governed by
x˙i = biui + φi(xi)θi, ∀i ∈ N , (3)
or
x˙i =vi,
v˙i =biui + φi(xi)θi, ∀i ∈ N .
(4)
Note that in (3) and (4), ui is the control input to be
designed and bi 6= 0 is an unknown constant. Moreover,
φi(xi) is a sufficiently smooth known function and θi is an
unknown parameter. Moreover, vi ∈ R is a state variable
of player i.
Furthermore, second-order systems in which player i’s ac-
tion is generated by
x˙i =bi1vi + φi1(xi)θi1
v˙i =bi2ui + φi2(xi, vi)θi2, ∀i ∈ N ,
(5)
where θi1, θi2, bi1, bi2 are unknown constants, φi1(xi) and
φi2(xi, vi) are smooth functions, will also be considered.
Note that in (5), bi1 and bi2 are nonzero.
The paper aims to design distributed control strategies
ui for systems in (3), (4) and (5), successively, such that
limt→∞ ||x(t)− x∗|| = 0 where x∗ is the Nash equilibrium
defined as follows.
Definition 2 An action profile x∗ = (x∗i ,x
∗
−i) is a Nash
equilibrium if for i ∈ N ,
fi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≤ fi(xi,x
∗
−i), (6)
for xi ∈ R, where x−i = [x1, x2, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xN ]T
[5].
The rest of the paper is based on the following assumptions,
which are widely adopted in related works.
Assumption 1 For each i ∈ N , fi(x) is sufficiently
smooth and ∂fi(x)
∂xi
is globally Lipshitz with constant li.
Assumption 2 There exists a positive constant m such
that for x, z ∈ RN ,
(x− z)T (P(x) − P(z)) ≥ m||x− z||2, (7)
where P(x) =
[
∂f1(x)
∂x1
,
∂f2(x)
∂x2
, · · · , ∂fN (x)
∂xN
]T
.
Assumption 3 The players are equipped with an undi-
rected and connected communication graph G.
For the systems in (3) and (4), the nonlinear term should
satisfy the following condition.
Assumption 4 For each i ∈ N , φi(xi) and
∂φi(xi)
∂xi
are
bounded provided that xi is bounded.
Moreover, for the system in (5), the nonlinear terms should
satisfy the following condition.
Assumption 5 For each i ∈ N , φi1(xi) and
∂φi1(xi)
∂xi
are
bounded provided that xi is bounded. Moreover, φi2(xi, vi)
is bounded if xi and vi are bounded.
Remark 1 Different from existing works on distributed
Nash equilibrium seeking that consider the control directions
to be known, we suppose that the control directions are un-
known a prior as bi (or bi1, bi2) for all i ∈ N are not known.
Moreover, the players may have different control directions
as we do not enforce sign(bi) (or sign(bi1), sign(bi2)) for
all i ∈ N to be the same. Note that in (3) and (4), θi is
supposed to be unknown as well, indicating that the players
are suffering from parametric uncertainties.
4 Main Results
In this section, we will establish distributed Nash equilib-
rium seeking algorithms for games in which the players’
actions are governed by (3), (4) and (5), successively. In
the following, Nash equilibrium seekers that are able to ac-
commodate the unknown control directions and paramet-
ric uncertainties will be proposed, followed by their corre-
sponding convergence analyses.
4.1 Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for first-order
systems with unknown control directions
In this section, we consider that the action of player i is
governed by
x˙i = biui + φi(xi)θi, ∀i ∈ N . (8)
In the following, method development and convergence
analysis will be presented.
4.1.1 Method Development
To achieve distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for sys-
tems with unknown control directions, let
ui = N0(ki)(xi − yi + φi(xi)θˆi), (9)
where N0(ki) = k
2
i sin(ki) and
k˙i =(xi − yi)(xi − yi + φi(xi)θˆi),
˙ˆ
θi =φi(xi)(xi − yi).
(10)
Moreover, yi is an auxiliary variable generated by
y˙i = −∇ifi(zi), (11)
where∇ifi(zi) =
∂fi(x)
∂xi
|
x=zi
, zi = [zi1, zi2, · · · , ziN ]T and
z˙ij = −δij
(
N∑
k=1
aik(zij − zkj) + aij(zij − yj)
)
, (12)
in which δij = δδ¯ij , δ is positive constant to be determined
and δ¯ij is a fixed positive constant.
Remark 2 The seeking strategy in (9)-(12) can be viewed
as two modules. The subsystem in (9)-(10) is designed to
drive xi to yi. The Nussbaum function in (9) is employed to
accommodate the unknown control directions and the sec-
ond equation in (10) is utilized to compensate the unknown
parameter θi. In addition, the subsystem in (11)-(12) is
adapted from [5] to act as a reference generator that would
3
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Fig. 1. The illustration of the information flows in the seeking
strategy.
drive y = [y1, y2, · · · , yN ]T to the Nash equilibrium x∗ [5].
The schematic outline of (9)-(12) is depicted in the Fig. 1.
4.1.2 Convergence Analysis
In this section, we provide the convergence analysis for the
seeking strategy proposed in (9)-(12). Before we proceed to
present the convergence results, the following supportive
lemma is given.
Lemma 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied.
Then, there exists a positive constant δ∗ such that for each
δ ∈ (δ∗,∞), the following conclusions hold:
• For each i, j ∈ N , yi(t) and zij(t) are bounded for t ∈
[0,∞).
• For each i ∈ N , y˙i(t) globally exponentially decays to
zero.
• For each i ∈ N , y˙2i (t) is square integrable over t ∈ [0,∞),
i.e.,
∫∞
0 y˙
2
i (s)ds ≤ ci for some positive constant ci.
Proof: Following the results in [5], it can be obtained that
there exists a positive constant δ∗ such that for each δ ∈
(δ∗,∞), y and z, where y = [y1, y2, · · · , yN ]T and z =
[zT1 , z
T
2 , · · · , z
T
N ]
T , globally exponentially converge to x∗
and 1N ⊗ x∗, respectively [5]. Hence, the first conclusion
directly follows the results in [5]. The second conclusion can
be reasoned as follows. As y and z globally exponentially
converge to x∗ and 1N⊗x∗, respectively, there are positive
constants η1, η2 such that
||[(y − x∗)T , (z− 1N ⊗ x∗)T ]T || ≤ η1e−η2t. (13)
For each i ∈ N , we get that
||y˙i|| = ||∇ifi(zi)−∇ifi(x
∗)||, (14)
by noticing that ∇ifi(x∗) = 0, ∀i ∈ N according to As-
sumption 2. By the Lipshitz condition of ∇ifi in Assump-
tion 1, we get that
||y˙i|| ≤ li||zi − x
∗|| ≤ li||z− 1N ⊗ x∗|| ≤ liη1e−η2t, (15)
thus arriving at the second conclusion.
For the third conclusion,
∫ ∞
0
y˙2i (s)ds =
∫ ∞
0
||∇ifi(zi(s))||
2ds
≤l2i
∫ ∞
0
||zi(s)− x
∗||2ds
≤l2i η
2
1
∫ ∞
0
e−2η2sds ≤
l2i η
2
1
2η2
,
(16)
thus arriving at the third conclusion with ci =
l2iη
2
1
2η2
. ✷
Note that by Lemma 3 and (11)-(12), y˙i and z˙ij are also
bounded as yi and zij for all i, j ∈ N are bounded.
With the above results in mind, we are now ready to show
that the players’ actions x can be driven to the Nash equi-
librium x∗ by utilizing the proposed method.
Theorem 1 Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied.
Then, there exists a positive constant δ∗ such that for each
δ ∈ (δ∗,∞),
lim
t→∞
||x(t) − x∗|| = 0, (17)
and ki(t), θˆi(t) for all i ∈ N stay bounded.
Proof: Define a sub-Lyapunov candidate function for player
i as
Vi =
1
2
(xi − yi)
2 +
1
2
(θi − θˆi)
2. (18)
Then, the time derivative of V along the trajectory is
V˙i =(xi − yi)(x˙i − y˙i) + (θˆi − θi)
˙ˆ
θi
=(xi − yi)
(
N0(ki)bi(xi − yi + φi(xi)θˆi) + φi(xi)θi
)
− (xi − yi)y˙i + (θˆi − θi)φi(xi)(xi − yi)
≤N0(ki)bik˙i − (xi − yi)y˙i + θˆiφi(xi)(xi − yi)
≤− (xi − yi)
2 + (N0(ki)bi + 1)k˙i − (xi − yi)y˙i
≤−
(
1−
Ci
2
)
(xi − yi)
2
+ (N0(ki)bi + 1)k˙i +
(y˙i)
2
2Ci
,
(19)
by noticing that |(xi − yi)y˙i| ≤
Ci(xi−yi)2
2 +
(y˙i)
2
2Ci
, where
Ci is a positive constant that satisfies Ci < 2.
Integrating both sides of (19), it can be obtained that
∫ tf
0
V˙i(τ)dτ ≤−
∫ tf
0
(
1−
Ci
2
)
(xi − yi)
2dτ
+
∫ tf
0
(N0(ki)bi + 1)k˙idτ +
∫ tf
0
(y˙i)
2
2Ci
dτ
≤
∫ tf
0
(N0(ki)bi + 1)k˙idτ +
ci
2Ci
.
(20)
Note that the last inequality is obtained by noticing that∫ tf
0
(y˙i)
2
2Ci
dτ ≤
∫∞
0
(y˙i)
2
2Ci
dτ ≤ ci2Ci according to Lemma 3.
Hence, Vi(t) and ki(t) are bounded on [0, tf) by Lemma
1, which indicates that xi − yi and θˆi are bounded. More-
over, as yi is bounded by Lemma 3, we obtain that xi is
bounded for t ∈ [0, tf ), from which we can further obtain
that x˙i, k˙i,
˙ˆ
θi are bounded over the time interval [0, tf ).
This implies that there is no finite-time escape for the
closed-loop system and hence tf =∞.
Taking the time derivative of k˙i gives
k¨i =(x˙i − y˙i)(xi − yi + φi(xi)θˆi)
+ (xi − yi)(x˙i − y˙i +
∂φi(xi)
∂xi
x˙iθˆi + φi(xi)
˙ˆ
θi).
(21)
As xi is bounded for t ∈ [0,∞),
∂φi(xi)
∂xi
is bounded for
t ∈ [0,∞) by Assumption 4. Moreover, noticing that
4
xi, yi, φi(xi), θˆi, x˙i, y˙i,
˙ˆ
θi are all bounded, we get that k¨i
is bounded. Hence, k˙i(t) is uniformly continuous with
respect to t. In addition,
∫ ∞
0
k˙i(s)ds = ki(∞)− ki(0) ≤ k
∗
i , (22)
where k∗i is a finite constant determined by the bounds of
ki(t).
Therefore, (xi(t) − yi(t))(xi(t) − yi(t) + φi(xi(t))θˆi(t)) is
integrable over t ∈ [0,∞). Hence
lim
t→∞
(xi(t)−yi(t))(xi(t)−yi(t)+φi(xi(t))θˆi(t)) = 0, (23)
by Lemma 2.
From the other aspect, taking the time derivative of
˙ˆ
θi gives
¨ˆ
θi =
∂φi(xi)
∂xi
x˙i(xi − yi) + φi(xi)(x˙i − y˙i), (24)
from which we see that
¨ˆ
θi is bounded by noticing that
xi, yi, x˙i, y˙i,
∂φi(xi)
∂xi
, φi(xi) are bounded.
Therefore,
˙ˆ
θi is uniformly continuous with respect to t.
Moreover,
∫ ∞
0
˙ˆ
θi(t)dt = θˆi(∞)− θˆi(0) ≤ θˆ
∗
i , (25)
where θˆ∗i is a constant determined by the bounds of θˆi.
Hence, by Lemma 2, we can obtain that
lim
t→∞
φi(xi(t))(xi(t)− yi(t)) = 0. (26)
By (23), we have xi(t) = yi(t) or alternatively, xi(t) −
yi(t) + φi(xi(t))θˆi(t) = 0 for t = ∞. Moreover, by (26),
we have φi(xi(t)) = 0 or xi(t) = yi(t) for t = ∞. Suppose
that xi(t) 6= yi(t) for t = ∞, then, φi(xi(t)) = 0 must be
satisfied. If this is the case, xi(t)− yi(t) + φi(xi(t))θˆi(t) =
xi(t) − yi(t) 6= 0 for t = ∞, indicating that (23) can not
be satisfied. Hence, we arrive at a contradiction and obtain
that xi(t) = yi(t) must be satisfied for t = ∞. Recalling
that y(t) → x∗ as t → ∞, which is proven in Lemma 3,
we arrive at the conclusion that x(t)→ x∗ as t→∞, thus
completing the proof. ✷
In this paper, we focus on the case in which the commu-
nication graph is undirected and connected for simplicity.
However, it should be noted that the presented results are
still valid for strongly connected digraphs. To highlight this
point, the following corollary is given.
Corollary 1 Suppose that Assumptions 1-2, 4 are satisfied
and the communication graph is strongly connected. Then,
there exists a positive constant δ∗ such that for each δ ∈
(δ∗,∞),
lim
t→∞
||x(t) − x∗|| = 0, (27)
and ki(t), θˆi(t) for all i ∈ N stay bounded.
Proof: The proof follows that of Theorem 1 by noticing that
the results in Lemma 3 are still valid for strongly connected
digraphs. ✷
In Theorem 1, we consider that each player i’s action is
subject to both unknown control directions (bi is unknown)
and uncertain parameter θi, i.e.,
x˙i = biui + φi(xi)θi. (28)
If there is no uncertain parameter, and the players’ actions
are generated by
x˙i = biui. (29)
Then, the proposed seeking strategy can be revised to be
ui = N0(ki)(xi − yi), (30)
where N0(ki) = k
2
i sin(ki),
k˙i = (xi − yi)
2, (31)
and yi is generated by (11)-(12). If this is the case, the
following corollary can be obtained.
Corollary 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied.
Then, there exists a positive constant δ∗ such that for each
δ ∈ (δ∗,∞),
lim
t→∞
||x(t) − x∗|| = 0, (32)
and ki(t) for all i ∈ N stay bounded.
4.2 Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for second-order
systems
In this section, we suppose that for each i ∈ N , player i’s
action xi is governed by
x˙i =vi
v˙i =biui + φi(xi)θi,
(33)
in which vi ∈ R is a state of player i.
4.2.1 Method development
To achieve distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for games
in which each player i’s dynamics is governed by (33), the
control input ui is designed as
ui = N0(ki)(xi − yi + vi + φi(xi)θˆi + (x˙i − y˙i)), (34)
where N0(ki) = k
2
i sin(ki) and
k˙i =(xi − yi + vi)(xi − yi + vi + φi(xi)θˆi + (x˙i − y˙i)),
˙ˆ
θi =φi(xi)(xi − yi + vi).
(35)
Moreover, yi is an auxiliary variable generated by
y˙i = −∇ifi(zi), (36)
where zi = [zi1, zi2, · · · , ziN ]T . Furthermore,
z˙ij = −δij
(
N∑
k=1
aik(zij − zkj) + aij(zij − yj)
)
, (37)
where δij = δδ¯ij , δ is positive constant to be determined
and δ¯ij is a fixed positive constant.
To establish the results for second-order systems, the fol-
lowing assumption is also needed.
5
Assumption 6 For each i, j ∈ N , ∂∇ifi(x)
∂xj
is bounded
given that x is bounded.
Remark 3 Compared the strategy in (34)-(37) with (9)-
(12), we see that the optimization modules are the same
while the regulation modules are different. As the system in
(33) is a second-order system, we further utilize x˙i and y˙i in
the seeking strategy. Recalling the definitions of x˙i and y˙i,
it is clear that the communication in the proposed seeking
strategy is still one-hop.
4.2.2 Convergence analysis
The following theorem illustrates the convergence result
for the proposed method.
Theorem 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1-3, 5-6 are satis-
fied. Then, there exists a positive constant δ∗ such that for
each δ ∈ (δ∗,∞),
lim
t→∞
||x(t)− x∗|| → 0. (38)
Moreover, ki(t) and θˆi(t) for all i ∈ N stay bounded.
Proof: For notational convenience, let ξi = xi − yi + vi.
Define the sub-Lyapunov candidate function for player i as
Vi =
1
2
(xi − yi)
2 +
1
2
ξ2i +
1
2
(θi − θˆi)
2. (39)
Then, the time derivative of Vi is
V˙i =− (xi − yi)(xi − yi − ξi)− (xi − yi)y˙i
+ ξi
(
biN0(ki)(ξi + φi(xi)θˆi + (x˙i − y˙i))
)
+ ξi (φi(xi)θi + x˙i − y˙i) + (θˆi − θi)φi(xi)ξi
=− (xi − yi)
2 − ξ2i + (biN0(ki) + 1)k˙i
+ (xi − yi)ξi − (xi − yi)y˙i
≤−
(
1
2
−
Ci
2
)
(xi − yi)
2 −
1
2
ξ2i
+ (biN0(ki) + 1)k˙i +
(y˙i)
2
2Ci
,
(40)
where Ci is a positive constant that satisfies Ci < 1.
Integrating both sides of (40) over t ∈ [0, tf) gives
∫ tf
0
V˙idτ ≤−
∫ tf
0
[(
1
2
−
Ci
2
)
(xi − yi)
2 +
1
2
ξ2i
]
dτ
+
∫ tf
0
(biN0(ki) + 1)k˙idτ +
∫ tf
0
(y˙i)
2
2Ci
dτ
≤
∫ tf
0
(biN0(ki) + 1)k˙idτ +
ci
2Ci
.
(41)
Hence, by Lemma 1, we get that Vi and ki are bounded for
t ∈ [0, tf ), which further indicates that xi − yi, ξi, θˆi are
bounded for t ∈ [0, tf). Recalling that yi is bounded, we
get that xi is bounded for t ∈ [0, tf). Hence, vi is bounded.
Therefore, there is no finite-time escape for the closed-loop
system, which indicates that tf =∞. Recalling (34)-(37),
we can obtain that x˙i, v˙i, y˙i, k˙i,
˙ˆ
θi are all bounded. Taking
the time derivative of k˙i(t) gives
k¨i =(v˙i + x˙i − y˙i)(ξi + φi(xi)θˆi + (x˙i − y˙i))
+ ξi(x˙i − y˙i + v˙i +
∂φi(xi)
∂xi
x˙iθˆi + φi(xi)
˙ˆ
θi)
+ ξi(x¨i − y¨i).
(42)
Note that x¨i = v˙i is bounded and y¨i =
(
∇ifi(x)
∂x
|
x=zi
)T
z˙i
is bounded as zi, z˙i are bounded and
∇ifi(x)
∂x
|
x=zi
is
bounded for bounded zi (by Assumption 6), it can be seen
that k¨i is bounded. Hence, k˙i(t) is uniformly continuous.
Moreover, ∫ ∞
0
k˙i(τ)dτ = ki(∞)− ki(0) ≤ k
∗
i , (43)
where k∗i is a constant determined by the bounds of ki(t).
Hence, by Lemma 2, we can obtain that (vi+xi− yi)(xi−
yi + vi + φi(xi)θˆi + (x˙i − y˙i))→ 0 as t→∞.
Similarly, ∫ ∞
0
˙ˆ
θi(τ)dτ = θˆi(∞)− θˆi(0) ≤ θˆ
∗
i , (44)
where θˆ∗i is a constant determined by the bounds of θˆi.
Hence, by Lemma 2, we can obtain that φi(xi)(vi + xi −
yi)→ 0 as t→∞.
Hence, for t = ∞, we have φi(xi)(vi + xi − yi) = 0 and
(vi + xi − yi)(xi − yi + vi + φi(xi)θˆi + (x˙i − y˙i)) = 0.
Case I: φi(xi) = 0 but vi + xi − yi 6= 0 for t = ∞. In this
case, xi − yi+ vi+(x˙i − y˙i) = 0. Recalling that as t→∞,
yi → x∗i , and y˙i → 0, we get that
x˙i = −
1
2
(xi − x
∗
i ), (45)
from which it is clear that x(t)→ x∗ for t→∞.
Case II: vi + xi − yi = 0 for t =∞. If this is the case
x˙i = −(xi − yi), (46)
as t → ∞. Recalling that limt→∞(yi(t) − x∗i ) = 0, we
can obtain that limt→∞ ||x(t) − x∗|| = 0. To this end, the
conclusion is obtained. ✷
Similar to Corollary 1, the following result can be obtained
if the communication graph is strongly connected.
Corollary 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1-2, 4, 6 are sat-
isfied and the communication graph is strongly connected.
Then, there exists a positive constant δ∗ such that for each
δ ∈ (δ∗,∞),
lim
t→∞
||x(t)− x∗|| = 0 (47)
and ki(t), θˆi(t) for all i ∈ N stay bounded.
4.3 Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for more general
second-order systems
In this section, we consider a game in which each player i’s
action is governed by
x˙i =bi1vi + φi1(xi)θi1
v˙i =bi2ui + φi2(xi, vi)θi2.
(48)
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Remark 4 Note that compared with (33), the effect of vi
on xi is also uncertain in (48) as bi1 is also unknown. In ad-
dition, an uncertain nonlinear term φi1(xi)θi1 is addressed
as well. Hence, in this problem, bi1 and bi2 are both un-
known directions that should be addressed. Moreover, both
θi1 and θi2 result in uncertain nonlinearities that should be
accommodated.
Motivated by [12], the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy
is designed in the following process:
Step 1: Generate a reference trajectory yi for i ∈ N that
would converge to the Nash equilibrium according to
y˙i =−∇ifi(zi)
z˙ij =− δij
(
N∑
k=1
aik(zij − zkj) + aij(zij − yj)
)
,
(49)
where j ∈ N , zi = [zi1, zi2, · · · , ziN ]T , δij = δδ¯ij , δ is pos-
itive constant to be determined and δ¯ij is a fixed positive
constant.
Step 2: Generate a reference trajectory αi for vi as
αi =N0(ki1)(xi − yi + φi1(xi)θˆi1)
k˙i1 =(xi − yi)(xi − yi + φi1(xi)θˆi1)
˙ˆ
θi1 =φi1(xi)(xi − yi).
(50)
Step 3: Let βi = vi−αi. Then, through direct calculation,
it can be obtained that
β˙i =v˙i − α˙i
=bi2ui + φi2(xi, vi)θi2 +Ψi1(xi, ki, θˆi1)θi1
+Ψi2(ki1, xi, yi, θˆi1, y˙i) + Ψi3(ki, xi, θˆi1, vi)bi1
(51)
where Ψi1 = −N0(ki1)
(
φi1(xi) +
∂φi1(xi)
∂xi
θˆi1φi1(xi)
)
,
Ψi2 = −(2ki1sin(ki1) + k2i1cos(ki1))(xi − yi)(xi −
yi + φi1(xi)θˆi1)
2 − N0(ki1)(−y˙i + φ2i1(xi)(xi − yi)) and
Ψi3 = −N0(ki1)
(
∂φi1(xi)
∂xi
θˆi1 + 1
)
vi. Accordingly, the
control input ui is designed as
ui =N0(ki2)(βi + φi2θ¯i2 +Ψi1θ¯i1 +Ψi2 +Ψi3b¯i1),
k˙i2 =βi(βi + φi2 θ¯i2 +Ψi1θ¯i1 +Ψi2 +Ψi3b¯i1),
˙¯θi2 =βiφi2,
˙¯θi1 = βiΨi1,
˙¯bi1 =βiΨi3.
(52)
Remark 5 Note that (50) is designed to drive xi to yi and
(52) is designed to drive vi to αi. The design of the control
input in (52) is motivated by [12] that treats vi as a virtual
control input for xi. To deal with unknown constants bi1
and bi2, two Nussbaum functions are included. To accom-
modate multiple Nussbaum functions, the idea is to design
the control input such that βi is square integrable (see also
[12]).
The following theorem establishes the stability of Nash
equilibrium under the control input designed in (52).
Theorem 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1-3,5 are satisfied.
Then, there exists a positive constant δ∗ such that for each
δ ∈ (δ∗,∞),
lim
t→∞
||x(t) − x∗|| = 0, (53)
and other variables stay bounded.
Proof: The proof is similar to those in [12] and Theorem 2.
For the convenience of the readers, sketch of the proof is
given as follows.
Step 1: Show that βi is square integrable by defining the
sub-Lyapunov candidate function as
Vi1 =
1
2
β2i +
1
2
(θ¯i2 − θi2)
2
+
1
2
(θ¯i1 − θi1)
2 +
1
2
(b¯i1 − bi1)
2.
(54)
Then, following the proof of Theorem 2, it can be obtained
that
V˙i1 ≤ −β
2
i + (bi2N0(ki2) + 1)k˙i2. (55)
Moreover, taking integrations on both sides of (55) over
[0, tf), we get that
∫ tf
0
V˙i1dτ ≤ −
∫ tf
0
β2i dτ +
∫ tf
0
(bi2N0(ki2) + 1)k˙i2dτ,
(56)
fromwhich it can be obtained that Vi1, ki2 and
∫ tf
0
(bi2N0(ki2)+
1)k˙i2dt are bounded by Lemma 1.
Moreover, from (56), it is clear that
∫ tf
0
β2i dτ ≤ Vi(0)− Vi(tf ) +
∫ tf
0
(bi2N0(ki2) + 1)k˙i2dτ.
(57)
Hence, βi is square integrable for t ∈ [0, tf).
Step 2: Show that xi can be driven to yi by defining the
other sub-Lyapunov function as
Vi2 =
1
2
(xi − yi)
2 + (θˆi1 − θi1)
2. (58)
Then, the time derivative of Vi2 is
V˙i2 =(xi − yi)(bi1αi + bi1βi + φi1(xi)θi1 − y˙i)
+ (θˆi1 − θi1)
˙ˆ
θi1
=(xi − yi)(bi1N0(ki1)(xi − yi + φi1(xi)θˆi1)
+ bi1βi + φi1(xi)θi1 − y˙i) + (θˆi1 − θi1)
˙ˆ
θi1
≤− (xi − yi)
2 + (bi1N0(ki1) + 1)k˙i1
+ (xi − yi)bi1βi − (xi − yi)y˙i
≤−
1
2
(xi − yi)
2 + (bi1N0(ki1) + 1)k˙i1
+
Ci1
2
b2i1β
2
i +
Ci2
2
y˙2i .
(59)
where Ci1, Ci2 are positive constants that satisfy
1
Ci1
+
1
Ci2
≤ 1. Noticing that both βi and y˙i are square integrable
for t ∈ [0, tf), we obtain that Vi1, ki1 are bounded for t ∈
[0, tf). Combining the above two steps, it can be seen that
xi−yi, ki1, θˆi1 as well as βi, ki2, θ¯i1, θ¯i2, b¯i1 are all bounded.
Recalling the definition of αi, it can be obtained that vi is
bounded. Furthermore, xi is bounded as yi is bounded by
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Lemma 3. To this end, we have shown that all the variables
contained in the closed-loop system are bounded for t ∈
[0, tf ), indicating that there is no finite-time escape and
tf =∞.
Step 3: The rest analysis follows the proof of Theorem 2
to take the time derivatives of k˙i1 and
˙ˆ
θi1 to show that
there are uniformly continuous. Then, take the integra-
tions of them over [0,∞) to prove that their integrations
are bounded. With the above conclusions in mind, by Bar-
balat’s lemma, limt→∞ k˙i1 = 0 and limt→∞
˙ˆ
θi1 = 0, from
which it can be obtained that limt→∞ xi(t)− yi(t) = 0 by
following the arguments in the proof of Theorem 1. ✷
Remark 6 The system dynamics considered in (48) is
similar to the one in [12] and the state regulation part is
motivated by [12]. However, different from [12] that regu-
lates the state to zero, this paper needs to regulate the state
to a time-varying reference trajectory (yi(t) for i ∈ N ),
generated by the optimization module.
5 Discussions on Fully Distributed Implementa-
tion of the Proposed Algorithms
In Section 4, the proposed seeking strategies contain a cen-
tralized control gain δ, which depends on the players’ ob-
jective functions and the communication graph. In general,
these centralized information can hardly be obtained. Ac-
tually, in [28], we proposed fully distributed Nash equilib-
rium seeking strategies by adaptively adjusting the control
gains. In the following, we further prove that the adaptive
algorithms in [28] can also be utilized in the proposed algo-
rithms to achieve fully distributed Nash equilibrium seek-
ing in the considered problem.
By the methods in [28], one can replace (11)-(12) in the
proposed algorithms with
y˙i =−∇ifi(zi)
z˙ij =− δij
(
N∑
k=1
aik(zij − zkj) + aij(zij − yj)
)
δ˙ij =
(
N∑
k=1
aik(zij − zkj) + aij(zij − yj)
)2
,
(60)
for i ∈ N .
Then, the following result can be obtained.
Lemma 4 Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied.
Then, with the strategy in (60), the following conclusions
can be obtained:
• For each i, j ∈ N , yi(t), zij(t) and δij(t) are bounded for
t ∈ [0,∞).
• For each i ∈ N , y˙i(t) is square integrable over t ∈ (0,∞),
i.e.,
∫∞
0
y˙2i (s)ds ≤ ci for some positive constant ci.
Proof: Following the proof of [28] to define V =
eTMe+ 12 (y−x
∗)T (y−x∗)+
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1(θij−θ
∗
ij)
2, where
θ∗ij >
8m||M||√N maxi∈V{li}+(2||M||N+maxi∈V{li})2
8mλmin(MM)
, e =
[z11−y1, z12−y2, · · · , z1N −yN , z21−y1, · · · , zNN −yN ]T ,
y = [y1, y2, · · · , yN ]T , M = L ⊗ IN×N + A0 and A0 is a
diagonal matrix with its elements being aij .
Then, it follows from [28] that
V˙ ≤ −a||E||2, (61)
where a > 0 andE = [(y−x∗)T , eT ]T , fromwhich it can be
obtained that for each i, j ∈ N , yi, zij and δij are bounded
for t ∈ [0,∞).
Moreover,
∫ ∞
0
y˙2i (s)ds ≤
∫ ∞
0
|∇ifi(zi(s))−∇ifi(x
∗)|2ds
≤l2i
∫ ∞
0
||zi(s)− x
∗||2ds.
(62)
Taking integration on both sides of (61), we obtain that
∫ ∞
0
V˙ (s)ds ≤ −a
∫ ∞
0
||E(s)||2ds, (63)
by which
V (∞) + a
∫ ∞
0
||E||2ds ≤ V (0). (64)
By further noticing that
∫ ∞
0
||zi(s)− x
∗||2ds ≤
∫ ∞
0
||E||2ds, (65)
we obtain that
V (∞) + a
∫ ∞
0
||zi(s)− x
∗||2ds ≤ V (0). (66)
Hence ∫ ∞
0
y˙2i (s)ds ≤
(V (0)− V (∞))l2i
a
, (67)
thus arriving at the second conclusion. ✷
With the results in Lemma 4, we can achieve the fully
distributed implementations of the proposed algorithms,
which is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied.
Then, for the system considered in (3) with the control input
in (9)-(10), where yi is generated by (60). Then,
lim
t→∞
||x(t) − x∗|| = 0, (68)
and all the other variables stay bounded.
It’s worth mentioning that for systems considered in
(4)/(5) and the proposed control inputs designed for the
corresponding systems, one can replace yi therein with the
one generated by (60) to achieve fully distributed imple-
mentations of the proposed algorithms. Note that we only
present the results for the system (3) and omit the rest to
avoid any repetitions in this paper.
Remark 7 In this section, we only provide an example to
illustrate the fully distributed implementations of the pro-
posed algorithms. However, it is worth noting that the pro-
posed algorithms actually provide a general framework to
deal with games in systems with unknown control directions.
That is, one may utilize other alternative approaches that
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Fig. 2. The communication graph among the players.
result in square integrable y˙i and bounded state variables
as well as their time derivatives to achieve fully distributed
Nash equilibrium seeking for systems with unknown con-
trols.
Remark 8 The modular design in this paper is motivated
by [25][31]. Though it was required that the controls should
be bounded in [25], the control directions were supposed
to be known. Moreover, [31] designed an extremum seeker
through robust state regulation and numerical optimization,
in which the control directions are also considered to be
known. Different from [19] that considered distributed opti-
mization problems with unknown control directions, this pa-
per addresses Nash equilibrium seeking problems with both
unknown control directions and parametric uncertainties.
In particular, the existence of multiple unknown control di-
rections and uncertain parameters is addressed. Though we
only investigate first-order and second-order systems ana-
lytically in this paper, we believe that under the proposed
framework, it is not challenging to extend the current re-
sults to high-order systems by backstepping techniques.
Though for presentation simplicity, we suppose that xi ∈
R, it should be noted that the presented results can be
directly adapted to deal with games in which the players are
of multiple heterogeneous dimensions. In the subsequent
section, an example in which xi ∈ R2 for i ∈ N will be
numerically studied.
6 A Numerical Example
In this section, we consider the connectivity control game
among a network of 7 mobile sensors considered in [1]. The
objective function of player i engaged in the game is defined
as
Fi(x) = hi(xi) + li(x), (69)
where xi = [xi1, xi2]
T ∈ R2 and
hi(xi) = x
T
i miixi + x
T
i mi + i
2, (70)
in which mii = diag{2i, i},mi = [i, 2i]T . Moreover,
l1(x) = ‖x1 − x2‖
2
, l2(x) = ‖x2 − x3‖
2
, l3(x) =
‖x3 − x1‖
2
, l4(x) = ‖x4 − x3‖
2,l5(x) = ‖x5 − x1‖
2 +
‖x5 − x6‖
2
,l6(x) = ‖x6 − x3‖
2
+ ‖x6 − x1‖
2
and l7(x) =
‖x7 − x2‖
2
. It can be calculated that the Nash equilibrium
of the game is x∗i1 = −
1
4 and x
∗
i2 = −1 for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7}.
In the simulation, the undirected and connected commu-
nication graph is plotted in Fig. 2. In the following, games
with dynamics in (3), (4) and (5) will be numerically
explored, successively.
6.1 Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for first-order
systems
In this section, we simulate first-order systems in (3),
where the control input is designed in (9)-(12). Note
that as xi ∈ R2, bi ∈ R2 × R2. In the simulation,
b1 = diag{3, 3}, b2 = diag{5, 5}, b3 = diag{−2,−2},
b4 = diag{1, 2}, b5 = diag{−3,−3}, b6 = diag{−1,−1}
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Fig. 3. The trajectories of xi(t) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7} generated
by (9)-(12).
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Fig. 4. The trajectories of kij for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7}, j ∈ {1, 2}
generated by (9)-(12).
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Fig. 5. The trajectories of θˆij generated by (9)-(12) for
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7}, j ∈ {1, 2}.
and b7 = diag{2, 2}. Moreover, φi = ixi. Let x(0) =
[−5, 3,−4,−6, 1, 8, 0,−8,−1, 10, 1, 2, 3, 0]T, and the initial
values for all the other variables in (9)-(12) be zero. Then,
generated by (9)-(12), the players’ action trajectories xi(t)
for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7} are plotted in Fig. 3, from which
it is clear that the players’ action trajectories converge
to the Nash equilibrium asymptotically. Moreover, Figs.
4-5 illustrate the trajectories of kij(t) and θˆij(t) for all
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7}, j ∈ {1, 2}, respectively. From Figs. 4-5, it
can be seen that these variables stay bounded. Therefore,
Theorem 1 is numerically validated.
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Fig. 6. The trajectories of xi(t) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7} generated
by (34)-(37).
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Fig. 7. The trajectories of kij for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7}, j ∈ {1, 2}
generated by (34)-(37).
6.2 Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for second-order
systems
In this section, we simulate the system in (4), where the
control input is designed in (34)-(37). In the simulation, bi,
φi(xi) and x(0) follow those in Section 6.1 and the initial
values for all the other variables are zero.
The players’ action trajectories xi(t) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7}
generated by (34)-(37) are depicted in Fig. 6, from which
it can be seen that the players’ actions converge the actual
Nash equilibrium of the game. In addition, kij(t) and θˆij(t)
for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7}, j ∈ {1, 2} are given in Figs. 7-8.
From Figs. 7-8, we can conclude that kij(t) and θˆij(t) for
all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7}, j ∈ {1, 2} stay bounded. Furthermore,
Fig. 9 demonstrates that vi(t) for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7} de-
cay to zero, which is aligned with the results in Theorem
2. To this end, the conclusions in Theorem 2 have been
numerically verified.
6.3 Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for more general
second-order uncertain nonlinear systems
In this section, we numerically verify the control input de-
signed for uncertain nonlinear systems in (5). To illustrate
the case, we suppose that the action of player 7 is gov-
erned by (5), and its control input is given by (49)-(52),
while all the other players’ actions are governed by (4)
with their control inputs being (34)-(37). For players 1-6,
bi and φi(xi) are chosen to be the same as those in Sec-
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Fig. 8. The trajectories of θˆij for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7}, j ∈ {1, 2}
generated by generated by (34)-(37).
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Fig. 9. The trajectories of vi(t) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7} generated
by (34)-(37).
tion 6.2. For player 7, b71 = b72 = diag{2, 2}, φ71(xi) =
7x7 and φ72(xi, vi) = [7x72, 7v72]
T . In addition, x(0) =
[−5, 3,−4,−6, 1, 8, 0,−8,−1, 10, 1, 2, 3, 0]T and the initial
conditions for all the other variables are zero. Generated
by the proposed methods, the players’ actions xi(t) for
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7} are shown in Fig. 10, from which we see
that the players’ actions converge to the Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, ki1(t) and θˆi1(t) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7} are plotted
in Figs. 11-12. Figs. 11-12 show that ki1(t) and θˆi1(t) stay
bounded. Moreover, the evolution of vi(t) is shown in Fig.
13, which shows that vi(t) for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7} are also
bounded. Hence, the effectiveness of the method in (49)-
(52) is also verified.
6.4 Fully distributed implementations of the proposed al-
gorithms
To verify the fully distributed implementations of the pro-
posed methods, we take first-order systems as an example.
The simulation setting of this section follows that of Sec-
tion 6.1 and δij(0) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7}, j ∈ {1, 2}.
The simulation results for the system considered in (3) with
the control input in (9)-(10), where yi is generated by (60)
are given in Figs. 14-17. Fig. 14 plots the players’ actions
from which we see that the players’ actions can converge
to the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, Figs. 15-17 plot ki(t),
θˆi(t) and δij(t), respectively, from which it is clear that
they stay bounded. Therefore, the results in Theorem 4 is
numerically verified. Note that compared with the simula-
tion in Section 6.1, there is no centralized control gain in
(60), thus verifying the effectiveness of the distributively
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Fig. 10. The trajectories of xi(t) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7} with player
7’s control strategy being (49)-(52) and the rest of the players’
control strategy being (34)-(37).
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Fig. 11. The trajectories of ki1(t) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7} with
player 7’s control strategy being (49)-(52) and the rest of the
players’ control strategy being (34)-(37).
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Fig. 12. The trajectories of θˆi1(t) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7} with
player 7’s control strategy being (49)-(52) and the rest of the
players’ control strategy being (34)-(37).
implemented algorithms.
7 Conclusion
This paper considers distributed Nash equilibrium seek-
ing for games in which the players’ actions are subject to
both unknown control directions and parametric uncer-
tainties. First-order systems and second-order systems are
addressed successively. To cope with the un-availability
of control directions, a Nussbaum function is adopted.
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Fig. 13. The trajectories of vi(t) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7} with player
7’s control input being (49)-(52) and the rest of the players’
control input being (34)-(37).
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Fig. 14. The trajectories of xi(t) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7} for the
system considered in (3) with the control input in (9)-(10),
where yi is generated by (60).
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Fig. 15. The trajectories of ki(t) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7} for the
system considered in (3) with the control input in (9)-(10),
where yi is generated by (60).
Moreover, the parametric uncertainties are addressed by
adaptive laws. Together with an optimization module, a
state regulation module is included in the seeking strategy.
Based on the Barbalat’s lemma, it is proven that the play-
ers’ actions can be driven to the Nash equilibrium. Lastly,
the fully distributed implementations of the proposed
algorithms are discussed. It is shown that the adaptive
techniques can be employed to achieve the equilibrium
seeking in a fully distributed way.
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Fig. 16. The trajectories of θˆij(t) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7} for the
system considered in (3) with the control input in (9)-(10),
where yi is generated by (60).
Fig. 17. The trajectories of δij(t) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 7}, j ∈ {1, 2}
for the system considered in (3) with the control input in
(9)-(10), where yi is generated by (60).
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